Since our Governance is fork of Bitocracy - the longer You stake, the greater Voting Power You get.
I agree on this. The question is on weight of the penalty.
If staking rewards are going to be nice - staking is going to be attractive.
In future - staking might be also the key to participate in yield earned from the lent out collateral stablecoins. This could happen, when we would reach desired rBTC insurance pool.
There are a lot of people who would prefer staking over LP - just to avoid some LP risks.
Thanks @Illusivegoose - that is very nice feedback. Keep it comming.
Voting Power, Yield, and Punishment
Below is an example of a voting power curve. We can start with the blue line with the largest shift in voting power from stakers of 42,000 to 4,200,000 FISH. This gives those with a large amount of FISH staked more voting power per FISH they have staked. For example someone with 42,000 FISH staked would get 24,000 voting power, whereas someone with 4,200 FISH staked would get 420 voting power. As the protocol becomes more stable, we can propose to shift the curve to the left (orange curve) to help decentralize the voting system. Also, there needs to be a multiplier for time staked (for example (1+ 0.1*months left staking).
The curve on the left is the shape that a APY curve would look like based on staking time. The curve on the right shows how staking yield and unstaking penalty would work on a monthly bases. Initially reward is higher than APY, but decreases giving the APY as the average. This drop over time incentivizes stakers to renew their stakes early. The dotted line shows the penalty slash for unstaking early. The difference is the “price” for ill gotten voting power. My thought that the difference could be equal to the % of voting power a staker unstakes. For example, if it is a small amount like 42 FISH, maybe that is only 0.0042% of the voting power so the slashing penalty % would be equivalent to (month staking yield % + 0.004%). The penalty becomes more severe for those who unstake a larger portion of the voting power.
It may need some more thought, but does this model seem good?
Looks interesting. It would have to be put in exact numbers to be implemented by devs.
We have to take into consideration also one thing - what would prevent people from using multiple wallets ? It is a lot of trouble, but I can imagine someone doing this.
Okay, here is a more specific model for the monthly yield and slashing penalty. The blue line is yield, the orange line is penalty considering staking time left, the gray line the penalty after adjusting with a multiplier for voting power (specifically 420,000 FISH in this graph). The multiplier is calculated with the equation y = 3.2*(x^0.42)+1, where x is the percentage of total FISH (420,000 → x = 0.001)
If voting power is going to be limited for big wallets, they could transfer a portion of the FISH to other wallets and use those to vote. That is what I have meant.
Since we are using fork of Bitocracy - at this moment - we have the same settings when it comes to Staking Penalties. Not sure about Staking rewards - as for testing purpose I have staked a very small amount.
@Harjo YES! Quarterly Governance Staking NFT Rewards which have in-game utility in BabelVerse. We have many functionalities we can associate with a query to authenticate a user’s NFT holdings.